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Abstract
We show that a black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function
needs to make Ω( nlog(n) ) calls to the underlying one-way function. The bound even holds if the
one-way function is guaranteed to be regular. In this case it matches the best known construction
due to Goldreich, Krawczyk, and Luby (SIAM J. Comp. 22, 1993), which uses O( nlog(n) ) calls.
1 Introduction
1.1 One-way functions and pseudorandom generators
Starting with the seminal works by Yao [Yao82], and Blum and Micali [BM84], researchers have
studied the relationship between various cryptographic primitives, such as one-way functions, pseu-
dorandom generators, pseudorandom functions, and so on, producing a wide variety of results. One
particular task which was achieved was the construction of pseudorandom generators from one-way
functions, a task which has a history on its own. First, it was shown that one-way permutations
imply pseudorandom generators [Lev87, GL89]. Later, the result was extended to regular one-way
functions [GKL93], and finally it was shown that arbitrary one-way functions imply pseudorandom
generators [HILL99].
Unfortunately, the constructions given in [GKL93] and [HILL99] are relatively inefficient (even
though they run in polynomial time). Suppose we instantiate the construction given in [GKL93]
with a regular one-way functions taking n bits to n bits. Then, it yields a pseudorandom gener-
ator whose input is of length1 Θ˜(n3) and calls the underlying one-way function Θ˜(n) times. The
parameters in [HILL99] are worse: if we instantiate the construction with an (arbitrary) one-way
function taking n bits to n bits, we obtain a pseudorandom generator which needs Θ˜(n8) bits of
input, and which does around2 Θ˜(n12) calls to f . The parameters of the security reduction are also
very weak.
Naturally, many papers improve the efficiency of these results: [HHR06a, Hol06] show that
the result of [HILL99] can be achieved with a more efficient reduction in case one assumes that
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1The Θ˜-notation ignores poly-logarithmic factors.
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the underlying one-way function has stronger security than the usual polynomial time security.
[HHR06b] reduces the input length of the pseudorandom generator in [GKL93] to Θ(n log(n)).
Also it reduces the input length in [HILL99] by a factor of Θ˜(n), and the number of calls by
a factor of Θ˜(n3). Most impressive, [HRV10] reduces the seed length to Θ˜(n4) and the number
of calls to Θ˜(n3), for the construction of a pseudorandom generator from an arbitrary one-way
function. Finally, [VZ12] reduce the seed length in this last construction to Θ˜(n3).
We remark that the main focus on the efficiency has been on reducing the seed length. This
is reasonable, as (private) randomness is probably the most expensive resource.3 Nevertheless, one
would like both the seed length and the number of calls to be as small as possible.
1.2 Black-box separations
After [BM84, Yao82], it was natural to try and prove that one-way functions do imply seemingly
stronger primitives, such as key agreement. However, all attempts in proving this failed, and so
researchers probably wondered (for a short moment) whether in fact one-way functions do not
imply key agreement. A moment of thought reveals that this is unlikely to be true: key-agreement
schemes seem to exist, and so in fact we believe that—consider the following as a purely logical
statement—one-way functions do imply key-agreement.
A way out of the dilemma was found by Impagliazzo and Rudich in a break through work [IR89].
They observed that the proofs of most results such as “one-way functions imply pseudorandom
generators” are, in fact, much stronger. In particular, the main technical part of [HILL99] shows
that there exists oracle algorithms g(f) and A(Breaker,f) with the following two properties:
• For any oracle, g(f) is an expanding function.
• For any two oracles (Breaker, f), if Breaker distinguishes the output of g(f) from a random
string, then A(Breaker,f) inverts f .
Impagliazzo and Rudich then showed that the analogous statement for the implication “one-way
functions imply key-agreement” is simply wrong, giving the first “black-box separation”.
After the paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich, many more black box separations have been given
(too many to list them all). We use techniques from several papers: in order to prove that there is
no black-box construction of collision resistant hash-functions from one-way permutations, Simon
[Sim98] introduced the method of giving specific oracles which break the primitive to be constructed.
Such oracles (usually called Breaker) are now widely used, including in this paper. Gennaro et
al. [GGKT05] developed an “encoding paradigma”, a technique which allows to give very strong
black-box separations, even excluding non-uniform security reductions. This encoding paradigma
has first been combined with a Breaker oracle in [HHRS07]. In [HH09] a slightly different extension
of [Sim98] is used: their technique analyzes how Breaker behaves in case one modifies the given
one-way permutation on a single randomly chosen input. We also use this method.
Some black box separation results are (as we are) concerned with the efficiency of constructing
pseudorandom generators. Among other things, Gennaro et al. [GGKT05] show that in order to
3We would like to mention that in part this focus also seems to come from the (somewhat arbitrary) fact that
people usually set the security parameter equal to the input length. For example, suppose we have a one-way function
from n to n bits with security 2n/100 (meaning that in time 2n/100 one can invert f only with probability 2−n/100).
If a construction now yields a pseudorandom generator with m = n2 bits of input, the security can at most be
2
√
m/100. At this point it becomes tempting to argue that because m 7→ 2
√
m/100 is a much slower growing function
than n 7→ 2n/100, it is crucial to make the input length as small as possible. However, if one introduces a security
parameter k, both primitives could have security roughly 2k. Arguing over the function which maps the input length
to the security is not a priori a good idea.
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get a pseudorandom generator which expands the input by t bits, a black-box construction needs
to do at least Ω(t/ log(n)) calls to the underlying one-way function (this matches the combination
of Goldreich-Levin [GL89] with the extension given in Goldreich-Goldwasser-Micali [GGM86]). In
[Vio05], Viola shows that in order for a black-box construction to expand the input by t bits, it needs
to do at least one of (a) adaptive queries, (b) sequential computation, or (c) use Ω(t ·n log(m)) bits
of input, when the underlying one-way function maps n to m bits. This result has been somewhat
strengthened by Lu [Lu06]. The papers [BJP11, MV11] both study how much the stretch of a given
generator can be enlarged, as long as the queries to the given generator are non-adaptive.
1.3 Contributions of this paper
A natural question to ask is: “what is the minimum seed length and the minimal number of calls
needed for a black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function?”
To the best of our knowledge, it is consistent with current knowledge that a construction has
seed length Θ(n) and does a single call to the underlying one-way function (however, recall that
[GGKT05] show that in order to get a stretch of t bits, at least Ω(t/ log(n)) calls need to be made).
The reason why no stronger lower bounds are known seems to be that from a one-way permuta-
tion it is possible to get a pseudorandom generator very efficiently by the Goldreich-Levin theorem
[GL89]: the input length only doubles, and the construction calls the underlying one-way permuta-
tion once. Also, almost all black-box separation results which prove that a primitive is unachievable
from one-way functions also apply to one-way permutations. The only exceptions to this rule we
are aware of is given by [Rud88, KSS11] where it is shown that one-way permutations cannot be
obtained from one-way functions, and [MM11], where this result is strengthened. However, both
these results use a technique which does not seem to apply if one wants to give lower bounds on
the efficiency of the construction of pseudorandom generators.4
One should note that a very efficient construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way
function might have implications for practice: it is not inconceivable that in this case, practical
symmetric encryption could be based on a one-way function, at least in some special cases where
one would like a very high guarantee on the security.
We show in this paper than any construction must make at least Ω( nlog(n)) calls to the underlying
one-way function. While this bound is interesting even for arbitrary one-way functions, it turns
out that our proof works with some additional work even if the one-way function is guaranteed to
be regular. In this case, the number of calls matches the parameters in [GKL93] (and recall that
the length of the seed has been reduced to O(n log(n)) in [HHR06b], with the same number of calls
to the one-way function).
In our theorem, we exclude a fully black-box reduction, using the terminology of [RTV04]. In
fact, we give three results.
In our first result, we assume that the construction g(·) when used with security parameter k
only calls the underlying one-way function with the same security parameter k. We believe that
this is a natural assumption, as all constructions we know have this property, and the underlying
input length is not immediately defined if g makes calls to f(k, ·) for various values of k. The result
is stated in Theorem 5.
Next, we study black-box constructions with the same restriction, but where the security re-
duction is non-uniform. These can be handled with the technique from [GGKT05], and in our case
it yields Theorem 6.
Finally, we remove the restriction that the construction calls the underlying function with a
fixed security parameter. This gives Theorem 7. However, one needs to be careful somewhat, since
4Both proofs use the fact that a one-way permutation satisfies g(v) 6= g(v′) for any v 6= v′ crucially.
3
in this case, the construction calls the given one-way function on a number of input lengths n, and
thus already the expression Ω(n/ log(n)) in our lower bound needs to be specified more exactly.
Our theorem uses the shortest input length of any call to f (i.e., our lower bound is weakest possible
in this case). Also, we remark that this last bound does not exclude the construction of “infinitely
often pseudorandom generators”, which are secure only for infinitely many security parameters.
2 The Main Theorem
We think of a one-way function as a family {fk}k≥0, indexed by some security parameter k. The
function fk then takes as input a bitstring of length n(k), and outputs a bitstring of length n
′(k).
Usually, the case n(k) = n′(k) = k is considered in the literature. We want to distinguish n
and k here, as we hope this makes the discussion clearer. However, we will still require that n is
polynomially related to k.5
Definition 1. A function n(k) : N → N is a length function if there exists c ∈ N such that
k1/c ≤ n(k) ≤ kc, n(k) can be computed in time kc, and n(k + 1) ≥ n(k) for any k.
In general, the length n(k) of the input of a one-way function differs from the length n′(k) of
the output. In case n(k) > n′(k), it is shown in [DHR08] how to obtain a “public-coin collection of
one-way functions”, where both the input and the output length are n′(k). Such a collection can
be used with known constructions to get a pseudorandom generator, and the number of calls will
only depend on n′(k). In case n(k) < n′(k), it is easy to see that one can also get a“public-coin
collection of one-way functions” with input and output length 2n(k).
Therefore, we can restrict ourselves to the case n(k) = n′(k), and see that otherwise, the
parameter min(n(k), n′(k)) is the quantity of relevance to us.
Definition 2. A one-way function f = {fk}k≥0 is a family of functions fk : {0, 1}
n(k) → {0, 1}n(k),
computable in time poly(k), such that for any algorithm A running in time poly(k) the function
mapping k to
Pr
x,A
[A(k, fk(x)) inverts fk] (1)
is negligible in k.6
A pseudorandom generator g = {gk}k≥0 is a family of polynomial time computable functions
gk : {0, 1}
m(k) → {0, 1}m
′(k) with m′(k) > m(k) and such that any algorithm B running in time
poly(k)
Pr
v,B
[B(k, gk(v)) = 1]− Pr
w,B
[B(k,w) = 1] (2)
is negligible in k.
We next define fully black-box constructions, but only for the special case of importance to us.
Note that we assume that the underlying one way function is regular (a function family {fk}k≥0 is
regular if |{x′ : fk(x
′) = fk(x)}| only depends on k and not on x).
5The requirement that n(k) ≤ kc is implicit in the definition of one-way functions, as otherwise the one-way
function cannot be evaluated in time polynomial in k. The requirement n(k) ≥ kc is different, however. For example,
suppose a family {fk}k≥0 can be evaluated in time kO(1) and has n(k) = log2(n). Also, suppose that fk is a one-way
function in the sense that in time kO(1) it cannot be inverted with probability k−O(1) ≤ 2−
√
n(k). If f is additionally
regular, fewer than Ω(n/ log(n)) calls are sufficient to construct a pseudorandom generator.
6We say that “A(fk(x)) inverts fk” if fk(A(fk(x))) = fk(x), and write A below the symbol Pr to indicate that
the probability is also over any randomness A may use. We also assume it is clear that x is picked from {0, 1}n(k).
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Definition 3. A fully black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator from a regular one-way
function consists of two oracle algorithms (g,A). The construction g(f) is a polynomial time oracle
algorithm which provides, for each length function n(k) and each ℓ, a function gℓ : {0, 1}
m(ℓ) →
{0, 1}m
′(ℓ) with m′(ℓ) > m(ℓ). For this, g may call f as an oracle.
Further, the security reduction A(·,·)(k, ·, ·) is a poly(k, 1ǫ )-time oracle algorithm such that for
any regular function f , any inverse polynomial function ǫ(ℓ), and any oracle Breaker for which
Pr
v,Breaker
[Breaker(ℓ, gℓ(v)) = 1]− Pr
w,Breaker
[Breaker(ℓ, w) = 1] ≥ ǫ(ℓ) (3)
for infinitely many ℓ, then
Pr
x,A
[A(Breaker,f)(k, ǫ(k), fk(x)) inverts fk] (4)
is non-negligible.
In a large part of the paper we restrict ourselves to the (most interesting) case where g only
calls f on a single security parameter.
Definition 4. A black-box construction is security parameter restricted if g(k, ·) only calls f(k, ·)
and A(k, ·) only calls Breaker(k, ·) and f(k, ·) for any k.
Our main contribution is the following theorem:
Theorem 5. Let n(k), r(k) ∈ poly(k) be computable in time poly(k), and assume that r(k) ∈
o( n(k)log(n(k))). There exists no security parameter restricted fully black-box construction of a pseudo-
random generator from a one-way function which has the property that g(k, v) does at most r(k)
calls to f(k, ·).
The above discussion assumes that the adversary is uniform (i.e., there is a single adversary
A(·,·) with oracle access to f and Breaker). However, many black-box results even work in case that
A can be a non-uniform circuit, and our result is no exception. We define non-uniform black-box
constructions in Section 7, and then prove the following theorem (we also change the security of
the one-way function from standard security to security s(k) in order to illustrate what results we
can get in this case).
Theorem 6. Let r(k), s(k), n(k) be given, and assume r(k) < n(k)1000 log(s(k)) for infinitely many
k. Then, there is no non-uniform security parameter restricted fully black-box construction of
a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function with security s which has the property that
g(k, v) does at most r(k) calls to f(k, ·).
In Section 8 we study what happens with black-box constructions which are not security
paramter restricted. To explain our results in this setting, we need a few more definitions. Suppose
we have given an oracle construction (g,A), and fix the oracle f (i.e., the one-way function). For
each ℓ we then consider the shortest call which g(ℓ, v) makes to f for any v:
n−f (ℓ) := min{n(k)|∃v : g
(f)(ℓ, v) queries f(k, ·)}. (5)
Analogously, for each ℓ we consider the maximal number of calls g(ℓ, v) makes to f :
rf (ℓ) := max{r|∃v : g
(f)(ℓ, v) makes r queries to f}. (6)
Note that both n−f and rf do in general depend on the oracle f .
Our second main theorem is then given in the following:
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Theorem 7. Fix a length function n(k). Let (g,A) be a fully black-box construction of a pseudo-
random generator from a regular one-way function. Then, there is an oracle f for which
rf ∈ Ω
( n−f
log(n−f )
)
. (7)
3 Notation and Conventions
In most of the paper, we consider one fixed security parameter k = ℓ. Then, the input length
n = n(k) of the one-way function and the input length m = m(k) of the pseudorandom generator
are also fixed.
3.1 Pseudouniform functions
A pseudouniform function is a family g = {gk}k≥0 of length preserving functions gk : {0, 1}
m(k) →
{0, 1}m(k) such that the output of gk is indistinguishable from a uniform string. An example is
given by the identity function, or any one-way permutation.
Definition 8. A function family g = {gk}k≥0 where gk : {0, 1}
m(k) → {0, 1}m(k) of poly(k)-time
computable functions is pseudouniform if, for all algorithms A running in time poly(k) the function∣∣∣Pr
A,v
[A(k, gk(v)) = 1]− Pr
A,w
[A(k,w)] = 1
∣∣∣ (8)
is negligible in k.
If we are given a family {gk}k≥0 which is both pseudouniform and a one-way function, then
we can obtain a pseudorandom generator using only one call to g by the Goldreich-Levin Theorem
[GL89]. Conversely, given a pseudorandom generator one can get a pseudouniform one-way function
by truncating the output.
Theorem 9. Suppose that g = {gk} is both a pseudouniform function and also a one-way function.
Then, hk(v, z) := (g(v), z,⊕
n
i=1vizi) is a pseudorandom generator.
Conversely, if g is a pseudorandom generator with m(k) bits of input, the truncation of g to the
first m(k) bits of its output is both pseudouniform and a one-way function.
Proof. The first part follows immediately by the fact that a distinguisher can be converted to a
next bit predictor [BM84] and the Goldreich-Levin Theorem [GL89].
For the second part, let g : {0, 1}m(k) → {0, 1}m(k)+1 be a pseudorandom generator where we as-
sume without loss of generality that g expands by 1 bit. If the truncation g′ : {0, 1}m(k) → {0, 1}m(k)
is not pseudouniform, there must be some distinguisher which has non-negligible advantage in dis-
tinguishing the output from a uniform random string. Such a distringuisher immediately contradicts
the pseudorandomness of g.
Suppose now that g′ : {0, 1}m(k) → {0, 1}m(k) is not a one-way function. Then, there exists
some (inverse) polynomial ǫ(k) and some algorithm A which inverts g with probability at least ǫ
for infinitely many k.
On some fixed security parameter k we now proceed as follows: first, let p be the probability
that A finds a preimage of g′ of a uniformly chosen element y ∈ {0, 1}m (i.e., the probability that
g′(A(y)) = y for a uniform random y). This can be arbitrary small, because the distribution is
different from the distribution induced by g′(x). Using sampling, we can find an estimate p′ of p
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such that with probability 1 − 2−k the estimate satisfies |p − p′| ≤ ǫ/4. If p′ ≤ ǫ/2, then we can
distinguish the output of g from uniform by checking whether A inverts g′ on the first m(k) bits.
On the other hand, if p′ ≥ ǫ/2 we can assume p ≥ ǫ/4. Now A immediately gives an inverter
for g which inverts a random uniform bitstring of length m+ 1 with probability at least ǫ/8 (just
ignore the last bit, invert g′, and hope the last bit matches). Finally, the probability an inverter
for g inverts an output of g is at least twice the probability it inverts a uniform bitstring. Thus,
we can get a distinguisher by checking whether A even finds an inverse of g, given only the first m
bits of the result.
Thus, we see that giving lower bounds on the construction of pseudorandom generators is
equivalent to giving lower bounds on the construction of pseudouniform one-way functions.
3.2 Normalization
Suppose we have a construction {g
(f)
k }k≥0 of a supposedly pseudouniform one-way functions, where
k is a security parameter. We make several assumptions on the construction which simplifies the
proofs. First, we assume that g never calls f twice with the same input, and does exactly r calls
to f . This is easy to achieve: one can modify g to get an equivalent oracle construction with these
properties. Next, we enlarge the range of g, and assume that in case two queries of f give the
same answer, then g outputs a special symbol which encodes a failure. This last restriction is not
completely trivial, as it can break some constructions of pseudouniform functions for some choices
of underlying one-way functions. As we will see in the proof of Theorem 5, in our case this is no
problem (because of the way we construct the oracles fk).
Definition 10. Let {0, 1}m∗ := {0, 1}m ∪{(⊥, v)|v ∈ {0, 1}m}. An oracle function g(f) : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}m∗ is r-query normalized if g(v) never queries f with the same input twice, does exactly r
calls to f , and whenever two outputs of f agree, g(f)(v) = (⊥, v).
We will write g instead of g(f) whenever f is clear from the context. Furthemore, we let
g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) be the function which never calls f but instead just uses yi as the reply of f to the
ith query.
3.3 Notations
Definition 11 (The Query-sets). The set Query(g, v, f) is {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)}, where xi is the
i-th query which g does to f in an evaluation of g(f)(v), and yi is the answer given by f . The set
Query(g′, v, y1, . . . , yr)) is defined similarly (in particular, it also contains pairs (xi, yi)). The sets
QueryX(g, v, f) and QueryY(g, v, f) contain the x and y-part of the pairs in Query(g, v, f).
For a pair (x∗, y∗), we define
f(x∗,y∗)(x) :=
{
y∗ if x = x∗
f(x) otherwise.
(9)
We use the following sets of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. For a set Y ⊆ {0, 1}n such that |Y|
divides 2n, F(Y) is the set of all regular surjective functions f : {0, 1}n → Y. Then, Pn is the set
of all bijective functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, i.e., the permutations. We use P instead of Pn when
n is clear from the context, and write f ← Pn or f ← F(Y) to pick a function uniformly from the
respective set.
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4 Overview of the Proofs
We now try to provide some intuition of the proofs. We concentrate on the proof of Theorem 5,
and only say a few words about the other theorems in the end.
Basic setting By the discussion above, it is sufficient to consider constructions of pseudouniform
one-way functions from one-way functions. Thus, suppose a fully black-box construction (g,A) of
a pseudouniform one-way function is given. We fix some security parameter k, and consider g(k, ·),
which only calls f(k, ·).
Our task is to come up with a pair (Breaker, f), such that Breaker(k, ·) either inverts g or
distinguishes the output of g from a uniform random string, and yet A(Breaker,f) will not invert
f(k, ·) with noticeable probability.
4.1 The case of a single call
We first study the case where g(f) does a single call to the underlying one-way function.
Example constructions We first discuss three example constructions for g(f), which all do r = 1
calls to f .
The first example g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as g(v) = f(v), i.e., the function simply
applies the given one-way function. Clearly, g will be one-way, so that Breaker must distinguish
the output of g from a random function; we will call such a breaker BreakPU. In this case, our
proof will pick f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as a very degenerate function (for example with image set of
size |Y| = 2log
2(n)). It is intuitive that BreakPU can distinguish the output of g from a uniform
random string without helping to invert f .
The second example g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as g(v) = v, so that the function simply
outputs the input v. In this case, clearly the function is pseudouniform, therefore Breaker will
break the one-way property of g using exhaustive search. We will call such a breaker BreakOW.
The last example g : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n is defined as
g(v, r) :=
{
(v, r) if r 6= 0n
(f(v), r) otherwise.
(10)
This function is pseudouniform no matter how f is defined. Thus, Breaker needs to invert g. One
sees that it needs to be careful in that: if BreakOW(y, 0n) returns a preimage of g, clearly A will
be able to invert. Thus, only images (y, r) with r 6= 0n should be inverted.
Inverting constructions with one call It turns out that we can describe BreakOW(w) in
general as follows: enumerate all possible inputs v, and evaluate g(f)(v) on each of them. In case
g(f)(v) = w, BreakOW considers the output y which appeared in this evaluation as answer to the
query done to f . It then considers the probability that w is the output in case nothing about f
or v is known, but conditioned on y to appear in the evaluation (assuming that f is chosen as a
permutation). If this probability is large (concretely, larger than 2−m+n/30), BreakOW refuses to
answer. Otherwise, it returns v.
A very quick intutition why this might not help to invert f is as follows: suppose an algorithm
A(BreakOW,f)(y) tries to invert y. In order to do use BreakOW, A needs to find some useful w for
this y. However, BreakOW ensures that it only inverts w which are not very likely to be outputs
for this y, so that A is unlikely to find a matching w. Thus, we can hope that A will fail.
We will sketch the actual proof that f remains one-way given BreakOW later.
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Invert or distinguish constructions with one call We now distinguish two cases: if BreakOW
inverts g for a randomly chosen f with probability (say) 12 , clearly we are done. Otherwise, it must
be that very often in random evaluations of g, once the output of f is fixed to y, certain values w
are much more likely (if the rest, i.e., v, and f , are still chosen at random). In this case, we first
pick Y ⊆ {0, 1}n, |Y| = 2log
2(n) as image set. We then show that there is some small set W (Y)
depending only on Y, such that if we pick f from F(Y) and v uniformly at random, with high
probability g(f)(v) ∈ W . Thus, we can distinguish the output of g(f)(v) from a uniform random
string by just checking whether it is in W , and this without even knowing the details of f (namely,
we can still pick f : {0, 1}n → Y uniformly at random).
The reason that g(f)(v) ∈ W (Y) is likely should be intuitive: we know that conditioning on
some fixed y highly biases the output w, and because there are only few y ∈ Y, the output should
still be biased overall.
The underlying one-way function remains one-way We still need to argue that BreakOW
does not help to invert a random permutation f . For this, suppose A(BreakOW,f)(y0) tries to invert
y0 = f(x0). Pick a random x
∗ and consider the function f∗ = f(x∗,y0), as defined in Section 3.3.
Also, let BreakOW∗ be defined as Breaker, except that it uses f∗ instead of f when it evaluates g
in the exhaustive search.
Intuitively, if A(BreakOW,f)(y0) is likely to return x0, then A
(BreakOW∗,f∗)(y0) must be at least
somewhat likely to return x∗, because x∗ has the same distribution as x0 from A’s point of view
(the same argument was previously used in [HH09], and in a more convoluted way in [Sim98]). This
means that the two runs of A have to differ in some call with noticeable probability. It is unlikely
that they differ in a call to f , since x∗ was picked at random and A makes few calls to f . Thus,
they have to differ in some call to BreakOW with noticeable probability.
However, it turns out that BreakOW∗(w) 6= BreakOW(w) for any w with very low probability:
it only happens in two cases. First, if x∗ is the query which g(f)(BreakOW(w)) makes to f , but
there is only one such query, so this happens with probability 2−n (over the choice of x∗).
The other case is if there is some v for which the output of g(f)(v) changes to w when we replace
f with f∗.
Now, recall the check BreakOW performs before it outputs v. This check is equivalent to the
following: enumerate all pairs (v′, y′), and count the number for which g(v′) = w in case f answers
the only query with y′. If this number is larger than 2n/30, refuse to return v.
This now implies that there can only be 2n/30 values for x∗ for which the output changes to w,
and so this case is unlikely as well.
4.2 Multiple calls
The case when g can make more than 1 call is significantly more difficult than the case where g
makes a single call. It turns out that most of the issues which arise can be discussed already for
r = 2 calls, so we restrict the discussion to this case in this section.
Construction with many calls Of course, the same examples as before still work. Thus,
BreakOW(w) still does the same check before returning v: does conditioning on one of the two
query answers y1 and y2 given by f in the evaluation of f(v) make w much more likely? If so, it
refuses to answer.
However, it turns out that we can restrict BreakOW(w) even more: it should also not return a
preimage v if conditioning on having seen both outputs y1 and y2 in an evaluation makes the output
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w more likely. As it turns out, we only know how to prove that BreakOW does not help invert f
with this additional restriction.
A useful example might be the construction, which takes as input a v = (x1, x2) of length 2n,
and is defined as
g(f)(x1, x2) =
{
(f(x1), f(x2)) if f(x1) = f(x2)⊕ (1, . . . , 1)
(x1, x2) otherwise.
(11)
This will be a pseudouniform function, because usually f(x1) 6= f(x2) ⊕ (1, . . . , 1). Also, we see
that an adversary A which tries to use BreakOW to invert y would presumably call BreakOW on
input (y, y ⊕ (1, . . . , 1)). However, using the additional restriction above, BreakOW will definitely
not return the inverse A is looking for.
We make two additional remarks: It turns out that if BreakOW inverts g(v) with low probability,
we can choose Y ⊆ {0, 1}n as small as 2Θ(n/r), and conditioned on f being from F(Y), the output
of g is very biased. Since Y is superpolynomial only as long as r ∈ o(n/ log(n)), we see that f stops
being a one-way function once r /∈ o(n/ log(n)).
Second, there is a question on whether above one should condition on y1 being the first output,
and y2 being the second output, or just on both y1 and y2 appearing as an output. We choose the
latter, as it seems more natural in the concentration bound explained below. It seems we can be
relatively careless with this, because rr ≪ 2n.
The underlying one-way function still remains one-way Again, we need to argue why
BreakOW does not help to invert f . As before, we can show that we only need to prove that with
high probability over the choice of x∗ we have BreakOW∗(w) = BreakOW(w). Previously, this
followed by a simple counting argument. Now, it becomes more difficult.
To see why, consider
g(f)(x1, x2) =

02n if x1 = x2 = 1
n
12n otherwise, if also x1 = f(x1) and x2 6= f(x2)
(x1, x2) otherwise
(12)
One can check that neither conditioning on a value of y1, y2, or on a pair (y1, y2) makes some
output w of g much more likely. Therefore, BreakOW(w) will simply return some preimage found.
Suppose now that f was picked in a very unlikely way: f(x) = x for any x. Then, BreakOW(12n)
will return ⊥, signifying that no preimage was found. On the other hand, for any x∗ and any f∗
as above, BreakOW∗(12n) will return (x1, x
∗) for some x1. Thus, for some functions f , BreakOW
∗
can behave very differently from BreakOW.
It is, however, possible to show that functions f for which this happens are very unlikely. In
case r = 2, a usual Chernoff bound is sufficient for that. For r larger than 2, a concentration
bound for polynomials in the style as proven by [KV00] seems to be needed. We will use a bound
from [Hol11], and show in Section 6 how it can be used to show that for almost all functions f ,
BreakOWf (w) 6= BreakOWf
∗
(w) has very low probability (over the choice of x∗).
It turns out that this concentration bound breaks down if r ∈ Ω(n/ log(n)).
4.3 Non-uniform security reductions
The above considerations prove Theorem 5, which exclude constructions with uniform security
proofs. The technique given in [GGKT05] allows to give security proofs which also hold against non-
uniform security proofs, and we can apply this technique in our context. We apply this technique
in Section 7, giving Theorem 6.
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4.4 On the security parameter restriction
Given our techniques, one might suspect that the restriction on the security parameter is inherent
to them. However, as we show in Section 8, this is not the case. Our proof will only break the
resulting pseudouniform one-way function only for infinitely many security parameters k, instead
of for all but finitely many k as one might hope.
This last restriction is inherent, at least as long as one only uses underlying regular one-way
functions. The reason is that constructions exist which do fewer than n/ log(n) calls, and yield a
pseudorandom generator for infinitely many security parameters.
In order to get rid of the restriction, we use the following idea: We consecutively find infinitely
many values ℓ for which g(ℓ, ·) does fewer than nlog(n) queries, where n is the shortest input length
which g queries on security parameter ℓ. After this, we simultaneously fix f(k, ·) for all k which
g can access. The idea is that underlying to f(k, ·), there could be a single one-way function for
many different values of k. Thus, we can reduce our task to the problem solved in the previous
sections.
Of course some technical problems arise. These are dealt with in Section 8.
5 The Breaker Oracles
We will give two oracles, each of which breaks one of the two security properties of g. The first
oracle inverts g with noticeable probability, and the second oracle distinguishes the output of g
from a uniform random string. For each security parameter k we will then set Breakerk to be one
of these two oracles, depending on the combinatorial structure of gk.
5.1 The inverting oracle
The first oracle is called BreakOW. It inverts g in some cases, and is given as algorithm below,
but we first explain it informally. On input w ∈ {0, 1}m, BreakOW(w) first enumerates all possible
inputs v ∈ {0, 1}m of g in lexicographic order. For each of them it checks whether g(f)(v) = w.
If so, it checks whether returning v could help some algorithm A to invert f . For this, it calls
the procedure SafeToAnswer. Roughly speaking, SafeToAnswer will return false in case this fixed
w correlates strongly with some outputs y ∈ {0, 1}n of f which occured during the evaluation of
g(f)(v). More exactly, SafeToAnswer enumerates all possible subsets B of the answers f gave in the
evaluation of g(f)(v). It then computes the probability that an evaluation outputs w, conditioned
on the event that the evaluation produces all outputs in B. If this probability is much larger than
2−m, SafeToAnswer will return false.
Algorithm BreakOW(f)(w)
procedure SafeToAnswer(w,Q): / SafeToAnswer does not depend on f
for all B ⊆ Q:
if Pr
f ′←P,v′
[g(f
′)(v′) = w|B ⊆ QueryY(g, v′, f ′)] ≥ 2−m+
n
30
return false
return true
done
for all v ∈ {0, 1}m do
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if g(f)(v) = w then
if SafeToAnswer(w,QueryY(g, v, f)) then
return v
return ⊥
We next define the quantity p(g). This is the probability that BreakOW inverts g(v) by return-
ing v (actually, not quite: BreakOW might return a different preimage of g(v) before it enumerates
v – in any case, the probability that BreakOW inverts g is at least p(g)).
p(g) := Pr
f←P
v←{0,1}m
[SafeToAnswer(g(f)(v),QueryY(g, f, v))] (13)
It is easy to see that in case p(g) ≥ 12 , then BreakOW
(f) will invert g(v) with noticeable
probability.
Lemma 12. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be a normalized oracle construction. If p(g) ≥ 12 , then
Pr
f←P,v
[BreakOW(g(f)(v))) inverts g(f)] ≥
1
2
. (14)
Proof. Pick v and f at random and call BreakOW(w) for w = g(f)(v). When BreakOW enumerates
all possible values v, at one point it will pick the actual chosen value v unless it has returned
a preimage of w before. With probability at least 12 , SafeToAnswer(w,Q) returns true where
Q = QueryY(g, v, f), in which case BreakOW(w) will return some inverse of w.
Our next goal is a more interesting claim: BreakOW is unlikely to help inverting f , when is
uniformly drawn from P. For this, we introduce the following definition (which is motivated by the
soon to follow Lemma 15).
Definition 13. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be an r-query normalized oracle construction. For
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, y∗ ∈ {0, 1}m, and w ∈ {0, 1}m, the set Qf,y∗,w contains all pairs (x
∗, v∗) with
the following properties:
(a) g(f
∗)(v∗) = w
(b) x∗ ∈ QueryX(g, v∗, f∗), i.e., g(f
∗)(v∗) queries x∗
(c) SafeToAnswer(w,QueryY(g, v∗, f∗)),
where f∗ = f(x∗,y∗).
We will prove the next lemma in Section 6 (some intuition on why this is true can be found in
Section 6.1). It states that with very high probability over the choice of f , the set Qf,y∗,w is small.
Lemma 14. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be an r-query normalized oracle construction, r ≤
n
100 log(n) . For all (w, y
∗) we have
Pr
f←P
[
|Qf,w,y∗ | > 2
n
10
]
< 2−2
n
100r . (15)
Fix now some permutation f , some y∗ ∈ {0, 1}n and some w ∈ {0, 1}m. Compare runs of
BreakOW(f)(w) and BreakOW(f(x∗,y∗))(w) for a random element x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n. The next lemma
shows that the result of these two runs is equal with high probability in case |Qf,y∗,w| is small.
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Lemma 15. Fix f , y∗, w. If |Qf,y∗,w| ≤ 2
n
10 , then
Pr
x∗
[BreakOW(f)(w) 6= BreakOW(f
∗)(w)] ≤ 2−
4n
5 (16)
where f∗ = f(x∗,y∗).
Proof. Let v be the result of BreakOW(f)(w), and v∗ the result of BreakOW(f
∗)(w). We distinguish
two cases.
First, suppose that v∗ = ⊥ or that v∗ occurs in the enumeration of BreakOW after v. This can
only happen if x∗ ∈ QueryX(g, v, f), because if not, BreakOW(f
∗)(w) will behave exactly the same
in the iteration of v, and so it must also return v.
Second, suppose that v = ⊥ or that v occurs in the enumeration of BreakOW after v∗. We
claim that in this case (x∗, v∗) ∈ Qf,y∗,w. Clearly, conditions (a) and (c) in Definition 13 must hold,
as otherwise BreakOW(f
∗)(w) will not output v∗. Condition (b) must also hold. Otherwise we have
that g(f)(v∗) = w (because of (a) and the fact that x∗ has not been queried) and QueryY(g, v∗, f) =
QueryY(g, v∗, f∗). This would imply that SafeToAnswer(w,QueryY(g, v∗, f)) = SafeToAnswer(w,QueryY(g, v∗, f∗)),
and so we see that if (b) would not hold, BreakOW(f)(w) = v∗.
Since the union of the sets QueryX(g, v, f) and Qf,y∗,w has fewer than 2
n
5 elements the result
follows.
Now we can show that BreakOW usually does not help to invert f .
Lemma 16. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be an r-query normalized oracle construction, r <
n
100 log(2n+m) . Let A
f,BreakOW be an arbitrary algorithm making at most 2
n
20 queries to f and to
BreakOW. Then, the probability that A inverts f(x) is at most
Pr
f←P,x,A
[Af,BreakOW(f(x)) inverts f ] ≤ 2−
n
30 . (17)
Proof. First, because f is picked from the set of permutations P, we see that
Pr
x,f←P,A
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) inverts f(x)] = Pr
x,f←P,A
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) = x] (18)
Fix now an arbitrary function f . In case f is such that for all pairs (w, y∗) the bound |Qf,w,y∗| ≤ 2
n
10
holds, we get for any x and any fixed randomness of A
Pr
x∗
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) 6= A(BreakOW
∗,f∗)(f(x))] ≤ 2
n
20 2−
4n
5 < 2−
n
20 (19)
where f∗ = f(x∗,f(x)), BreakOW = BreakOW
(f), and BreakOW∗ = BreakOW(f
∗). This holds
because any of the 2
n
20 calls to either oracle will return the same answer with probability 2−
4n
5
(using Lemma 15 for calls to BreakOW, for calls to f this is obvious).
We can also pick x and f at random, then we get
Pr
f,x,x∗
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) 6= A(BreakOW
∗,f∗)(f(x))]
≤ Pr
f
[∃(w, y∗) : |Qf,w,y∗ | > 2
n
10 ] + 2−
n
20
≤ 2m+n−2
n
100r + 2−
n
20 < 2−
n
20
+1 , (20)
where we applied Lemma 14.
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Still fixing the randomness of A, we see that
Pr
f,x
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) = x] ≤ Pr
f,x∗,x
[A(BreakOW
∗,f∗)(f(x)) = x] + 2−
n
20
+1 (21)
= Pr
f,x∗,x
[A(BreakOW
∗,f∗)(f(x)) = x∗] + 2−
n
20
+1 (22)
≤ Pr
f,x∗,x
[A(BreakOW,f)(f(x)) = x∗] + 2−
n
20
+2 (23)
= 2−n + 2−
n
20
+2 < 2−
n
30 , (24)
where we get (22) because the triples (f∗, f(x), x) and (f∗, f(x), x∗) have exactly the same distri-
bution. We used (20) to get (21) and (23).
Since this holds for each random choice A can make, it must also hold overall.
5.2 The distinguishing oracle
Oracle BreakOW described above works well in case p(g) ≥ 12 . Therefore, we now concentrate
on the case p(g) ≤ 12 . In this case, there are elements y1, . . . , yb such that conditioned on those
occuring as outputs of f , some elements w are much more likely than others (in fact, on a random
evaluation we have probability at least 12 that a subset of the y’s produced satisfies this). Thus, it
is not too far fetched to hope that if f is a function f : {0, 1}n → Y for some set Y ⊆ {0, 1}n which
is small, then often g(f)(v) will be one of few possible values. Formally, we can prove the following
lemma.
Lemma 17. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be an r-query normalized oracle construction with
p(g) ≤ 12 ,
n
1000r ∈ N. There exists Y ⊆ {0, 1}
n of size |Y| = 2
n
100r and a set W ⊆ {0, 1}m of size
|W | ≤ 2m−
n
100 such that
Pr
f←F(Y)
v←{0,1}m
[g(f)(v) ∈W ] ≥
1
2
− r22−
n
100r (25)
Proof. We pick Y ⊆ {0, 1}n of size 2
n
100r uniformly at random, and then set
W =
{
w
∣∣∣ ∃Q ⊆ Y : |Q| = r ∧ ¬SafeToAnswer(w,Q)} . (26)
We start by showing that |W | ≤ 2m−
n
100 . There are fewer than (|Y |)r = 2
n
100 subsets Q ⊆ Y
of size |Q| = r, and for each of them, SafeToAnswer considers 2r ≤ 2
n
100 subsets B. For each B,
there can be at most 2m−
n
30 elements w which have probability at least 2−m+
n
30 conditioned on
B ⊆ QueryY(g, v, f ′). Thus, in total there can be at most 2m−
n
30
+ n
100
+ n
100 ≤ 2m−
n
100 elements in W .
To see (25), we note first that
Pr
Y,f←F(Y)
v←{0,1}m
[g(f)(v) ∈W ] = Pr
Y,v←{0,1}m
(y1,...,yr)←(P (r,Y))
[g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) ∈W ] , (27)
where the distribution P (r,Y) over Yr is the distribution of (f(x0), . . . , f(xr−1)) for some fixed
pairwise disjoint values x0, . . . , xr−1 and f ← F(Y). It has the following two properties. First, the
probability that P (r,Y) gives r pairwise disjoint outputs is at least 1 − r
2
|Y| (by a union bound).
Second, all tuples (y1, . . . , yr) in which the elements are pairwise disjoint have the same probability
when the probability is also over the choice of Y.
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Thus,
Pr
Y,v←{0,1}m
(y1,...,yr)←(P (r,Y))
[g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) ∈W ] (28)
≥ Pr
Y,v←{0,1}m
(y1,...,yr)←(P (r,Y))
[
|{y1, . . . , yr}| = r
]
× (29)
Pr
Y,v←{0,1}m
(y1,...,yr)←(P (r,Y))
[
g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) ∈W
∣∣ |{y1, . . . , yr}| = r] (30)
≥ Pr
Y,v←{0,1}m
(y1,...,yr)←(P (r,Y))
[
|{y1, . . . , yr}| = r
]
× (31)
Pr
(y1,...,yr)
[g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) ∈W ] , (32)
where in this last probability the values y1, . . . , yr are picked uniformly without repetition. Next,
we see that
Pr
(y1,...,yr)
[
g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) ∈W
]
(33)
≥ Pr
(y1,...,yr)
[
¬SafeToAnswer(g′(v, y1, . . . , yr), {y1, . . . , yr})] (34)
= 1− p(g) (35)
because without repetition the yi have exactly the same distribution as in the definition of p(g). In
total,
Pr
Y,f←F(Y)
v←{0,1}m
[g(f)(v) ∈W ] ≥
(
1−
r2
|Y|
)
(1− p(g)) . (36)
Let now BreakPU(W ) be the oracle which on input w returns 1 if and only if w ∈W . The next
lemma states that BreakPU(W ) does not help significantly in inverting f . This is intuitive, since it
does not even depend on f (besides the choice of Y). Furthermore, this lemma also follows directly
from [GGKT05, Theorem 1]. To see this, note that we can pick f as follows: first pick any regular
function p : {0, 1}n → Y and then set f = π ◦ p for some permutation π; by [GGKT05, Theorem
1], f is 2|Y|
(1/5)
-hard to invert even given p. We provide a proof anyhow for completeness.
Lemma 18. Let A be an arbitrary oracle algorithm making at most 2
n
1000r queries, |Y| = 2
n
100r ,
n
1000r ∈ N. Then,
Pr
f←F(Y),x,A
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) inverts f ] ≤ 2−
n
1000r , (37)
where BreakPU = BreakPU(W ) for an arbitrary set W .
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 16.
Proof. We first note that
Pr
f←F(Y)
x,A
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) inverts f(x)] =
2n
|Y|
Pr
f←F(Y)
x,A
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) = x] (38)
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because for any fixed f(x), the value of x is still uniform among the 2
n
|Y| preimages.
Now, fix any x and any f , and let q = 2
n
1000r be the upper bound on the number of queries by
A. Keeping the randomness of A fixed,
Pr
x∗
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) 6= Af
∗,BreakPU(f(x))] ≤
q
2n
, (39)
where f∗ = f(x∗,f(x)), because the output of A
f∗,BreakPU(f(x)) can only differ from Af,BreakPU(f(x))
in case x∗ is one of the elements on which A queried f .
As in the proof of Lemma 16,
Pr
f←F(Y)
x,x∗
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) = x] ≤ Pr
f←F(Y)
x,x∗
[Af
∗,BreakPU(f(x)) = x] +
q
2n
(40)
= Pr
f←F(Y)
x,x∗
[Af
∗,BreakPU(f(x)) = x∗] +
q
2n
≤
2q + 1
2n
. (41)
Together,
Pr
x←{0,1}n,f
[Af,BreakPU(f(x)) inverts f(x)] ≤
2n
|Y|
2q + 1
2n
=
2q + 1
|Y|
. (42)
5.3 Proving the main result
The above lemmas can be used to prove Theorem 5, which we restate here for reference.
Theorem 5. Let n(k), r(k) ∈ poly(k) be computable in time poly(k), and assume that r(k) ∈
o( n(k)log(n(k))). There exists no security parameter restricted fully black-box construction of a pseudo-
random generator from a one-way function which has the property that g(k, v) does at most r(k)
calls to f(k, ·).
Proof. In order to get a contradiction, we assume otherwise. Because of Theorem 9, we can also
assume that we have a fully black-box reduction which gives a pseudouniform one-way function
(which is defined in a way analogous to Definition 3).
Thus, suppose we have some construction (g,A). We we want to instantiate the construction
with length preserving one-way functions, where the input and output length equals the security
parameter k, i.e., n(k) := n′(k) := k. The construction must work for this choice by definition.
We can assume that n(k)1000r(k) ∈ N for all but finitely many k, because we can increase r(k) such
that this holds and such that still r(k) ∈ o( n(k)log(n(k))).
We now make sure that our construction is normalized. For this, we modify g such that it
makes exactly r(k) pairwise disjoint queries to f ; clearly, this is no problem.
We then define
g˜(fk)(v) :=
{
(⊥, v) if two queries of fk yield the same output
g
(fk)
k (v) otherwise.
(43)
Next, we will provide, for each k seperately, two oracles f and B = Breaker. We construct
these oracles such that B breaks the security property of gk for all but finitely many k, and yet the
probability that ABreaker,f inverts f is negligible.
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For this, we consider p(g˜k) for each k seperately. If p(g˜k) ≥
1
2 we set Breakerk to be BreakOW.
By Lemma 12 we see that for these k
Pr
fk←Pk,v
[Breakerk(g˜
(fk)
k (v))) inverts g˜
(fk)
k ] ≥
1
2
. (44)
By Lemma 16 we also see that, if k is large enough,
Pr
fk←Pk,x,A
[Afk ,Breakerk(fk(x)) inverts fk] ≤ 2
−
n(k)
30 . (45)
Note that in this case, g˜k behaves the same as gk, because no two queries to fk can output the
same value. Applying Markov’s inequality, for fraction at least 110 of the functions fk we have
Pr
v
[Breakerk(g
(fk)
k (v))) inverts g
(fk)
k ] ≥
1
10
(46)
Furthermore, for fraction at least 99100 of the functions fk we have
Pr
x,A
[Afk ,Breakerk(fk(x)) inverts fk] ≤ 100 · 2
−n(k)
30 . (47)
We pick a function fk for which both (46) and (47) are satisfied.
If p(g˜k) ≤
1
2 , Lemma 17 gives a set Wk ⊆ {0, 1}
m(k) and Yk ⊆ {0, 1}
n(k). For n large enough, A
satisfies the requirements of Lemma 18, and we see that
Pr
fk←F(Yk)
A,x←{0,1}n(k)
[ABreakPU(Wk),fk(fk(x)) inverts fk(x)] ≤ 2
− n
1000r , (48)
which is negligible. By Lemma 17
Pr
fk←F(Yk)
v←{0,1}m(k)
[g˜
(fk)
k (v) ∈Wk] ≥
1
4
, (49)
again for k is large enough. Because Y is of superpolynomial size, the probability that g˜k outputs
(⊥, v) is still negligible. Thus, we can argue as before, and there is some choice of fk for which
Pr
A,x←{0,1}n(k)
[ABreakerk,fk(fk(x)) inverts fk(x)] ≤ 2
− n
110r , and (50)
Pr
v←{0,1}m(k)
[g
(fk)
k (v) ∈Wk] ≥
1
10
. (51)
We fix such a choice of for fk and set Breakerk := BreakPU(Wk).
We conclude that while the statement analogous to (3) holds (for breaking the either the pseu-
douniformity or for inverting g), the statement (4) fails to hold, and so we get a contradiction.
6 Proof of Lemma 14
In this section, we give the proof of Lemma 14. However, before giving the proof, we provide some
intuition in Section 6.1 (which can be skipped if desired).
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6.1 Intuition
Fix (f, y∗, w), and assume that (x∗, v∗) ∈ Qf,y∗,w. Consider the query-answer pairs {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)} =
Query(g, v∗, f(x∗,y∗)) which occur in an evaluation of g
(f(x∗,y∗))(v∗). The pair (x∗, y∗) must be in
this set, as otherwise conditions (a) or (b) of Definition 13 would not hold, and to simplify the
discussion we make the (unrealistic) assumption that always (x∗, y∗) = (xr, yr). Now consider the
set T = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr−1, yr−1)}. Let us call T an incrementor for |Qf,y∗,w|, because whenever
f satisfies f(xi) = yi for i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}, the set Qf,y∗,w grows by 1.
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Now, still fixing (f, y∗, w), the total number of such “incrementors” for |Qf,y∗,w| is at most
2(r−1)n+
n
30 . To see this, we argue that otherwise, (for yr being the answer of the r-th query in the
evaluation)
Pr
f ′←P,v′
[gf
′
(v′) = w|yr = y
∗] ≥ 2−m+
n
30 , (52)
because any of the incrementors survive8 the picking of f with probability roughly9 2−(r−1)n. Thus,
if there are 2(r−1)n+
n
30 incrementors, in expectation 2
n
30 will survive the picking of f , and if we pick
one10 of the 2
n
30 values v∗ which survived we get an element for which gf
′
(v′) = w (conditioning on
yr = y
∗). Now, (52) roughly contradicts SafeToAnswer(w,Q) for B = {y∗} (up to some issues due
to our simplifying assumption that (x∗, y∗) is always (xr, yr), but since r
r < 2n they do not matter
much).
Thus, there are at most 2(r−1)n+
n
30 incrementors for |Qf,y∗,w|, and so in expectation |Qf,w,y∗ | ≤
2
n
30 . However, we need to prove that the |Qf,w,y∗| is small with (very) high probability, and not
in expectation. Luckily for us, Kim and Vu [KV00] proved a concentration bound which can be
applied in our setting – translated to our setting, they show that concentration does hold if several
conditions are given. First, it needs to hold that all probabilities checked in SafeToAnswer are
smaller than 2−m+
n
30 (which is, besides Lemma 17, the reason that SafeToAnswer is defined in the
way it is defined). Second, they roughly require that rr < 2n, which holds in our case, because
we assume that r /∈ Ω( nlog(n)). Finally, they require that the events f(x1) = y1 and f(x2) = y2
are independent—which of course is a problem, because this does not hold in our case. Luckily, it
turns out that this last requirement can be relaxed somewhat using a proof technique implicit in
[SSS95] (see [Rao08, IK10]). A proof of a Kim-Vu style concentration bound in this form was given
by the first author in [Hol11].
6.2 The polynomial Pw,y∗
To prove Lemma 14, we will first find a polynomial Pw,y∗ of degree r in variables F(x,y) for all
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n. The polynomial will have the following property: fix an arbitrary function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and set the variables F(x,y) as follows:
F(x,y) =
{
1 if f(x) = y
0 otherwise.
(53)
We will see that the value of Pw,y∗ for these values (evaluated over R or N) gives an upper bound
on |Qf,y∗,w|. We denote this value by Pw,y∗(f).
7Ignoring a few reasons why this might not be true sometimes. . . like the fact that SafeToAnswer might return
false.
8Formally, surviving means that f(xi) = yi for all pairs (xi, yi) in the incrementor.
9Ignoring very slight dependence in this discussion which arises from the fact that f is picked as a permutation.
10Only one incrementor with a fixed v∗ can survive with our assumptions.
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The polynomial Pw,y∗ is obtained by a run of algorithm BuildPolynomial(w, y
∗).
Algorithm BuildPolynomial(w, y∗)
Pw,y∗ := 0
forall (y1, . . . , yr) ∈ ({0, 1}
n)r do
if SafeToAnswer(w, {y1, . . . , yr}) then
forall v ∈ {0, 1}m do
if g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) = w ∧ y
∗ ∈ {y1, . . . , yr} then
T := {(xi, yi) : i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and yi 6= y
∗ and . . .
xi is the ith query done by g
′(v, y1, . . . , yr)}
Pw,y∗ := Pw,y∗ +
∏
(x,y)∈T
F(x,y)
return Pw,y∗
For readers who did not skip the intuition, we can connect this with Section 6.1. The term∏
(x,y) F(x,y) corresponds to an incrementor, and we note that if the incrementor survives the picking,
the summand in the polynomial will evaluate to 1.
Lemma 19. For any f , w, y∗ we have |Qf,w,y∗| ≤ Pw,y∗(f).
Proof. Pick f at first, and then consider a run of BuildPolynomial. We show that for each pair
(x∗, v∗) ∈ Qf,w,y∗ the procedure BuildPolynomial(w, y
∗) adds a monomial to Pw,y∗ which evaluates
to 1 under f .
Fix now a pair (x∗, v∗) ∈ Qf,w,y∗ , and let (x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr) be the pairs of queries and answers
made to f(x∗,y∗) in an evaluation of g
(f(x∗,y∗))(v∗). It must be that x∗ ∈ {x1, . . . , xr}, because of con-
dition (b) in Definition 13, and so (x∗, y∗) ∈ {(x1, y1), . . . , (xr, yr)}. SafeToAnswer(w, {y1, . . . , yr})
must also hold (as otherwise (x∗, v∗) /∈ Qf,w,y∗). Thus, when BuildPolynomial enumerates the
values (y1, . . . , yr) and v
∗, it adds
∏
(x,y)∈T F(x,y) to Pw,y∗, which is 1 for the assignment given by
f to the variables (note that T does not contain (x∗, y∗)).
6.3 Derivatives of Pw,y∗
Let now B ⊂ {F(x,y)} be a subset of the random variables F(x,y). For any multilinear polynomial
P in the variables {F(x,y)} we let ∂BP be the formal derivative of P with respect to the variables
in B. For example, ∂{F(1,1),F(2,2)}(F(1,1)F(2,2)F(3,3) + F(1,1)F(3,3)F(4,4)) = F(3,3).)
Let F∗ be the distribution over the variables F(x,y) in which each F(x,y) is 1 with probability
1
2n
and 0 otherwise, and all variables are independent. When we pick the variables according to this
distribution, they usually cannot have been derived from a function f as in (53). Nevertheless, this
distribution is useful to express combinatorial properties of our polynomials. We denote the value
of the polynomial evaluated at such a point F by Pw,y∗(F).
Lemma 20. For any B ⊆ ({0, 1}n)2 and any (w, y∗):
E
F←F∗
[
(∂BPw,y∗)(F)
]
≤ 2
2n
30 . (54)
Proof. Suppose otherwise, and fix a triple (B,w, y∗) for which (54) fails to hold. We will derive a
contradiction.
The polynomial ∂BPw,y∗ is the sum of all monomials in Pw,y∗ which contain the factor
∏
(x,y)∈B F(x,y),
but with this factor removed. Each such summand contributes 2−n(r−1−|B|) to the expectation
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in (54), and so there are at least 2
2n
30
+n(r−1−|B|) monomials containing a factor
∏
(x,y)∈B F(x,y) in
Pw,y∗ . This implies that there are at least that many monomials containing a factor of the form∏
(x,y)∈B F(∗,y), where F(∗,y) is an arbitrary variable F(x′,y′) with y
′ = y.
The following algorithm adds 2−n(r−1−|B|) to a counter for each such monomial in Pw,y∗ . There-
fore, it outputs at least 2
2n
30 .
Algorithm UpperBound(B,w, y∗)
EB,w,y∗ := 0
B′ := {y∗} ∪ {y : (x, y) ∈ B}
forall (y1, . . . , yr) ∈ ({0, 1}
n)r do
if B′ ⊆ {y1, . . . , yr} then
if SafeToAnswer(w, {y1, . . . , yr}) then
forall v ∈ {0, 1}m do
if g′(v, y1, . . . , yr) = w then
EB,w,y∗ := EB,w,y∗ + 2
−n(r−|B′|)
return EB,w,y∗
Consider now an arbitrary (y1, . . . , yr) for which EB,w,y∗ gets increased in this algorithm. We
want to show that ¬SafeToAnswer(w, {y1, . . . , yr}), i.e., we want to show that
Pr
f ′,v′
[g(f
′)(v′) = w|B′′ ⊆ QueryY(g, v′, f ′)] ≥ 2−m+
n
30 (55)
for some B′′ ⊆ {y1, . . . , yr}. Of course, it suffices to show this for B
′′ = B′.
To see that (55) holds for B′′ = B′ we compute
Pr
f ′,v′
[g(f
′)(v′) = w|B′ ⊆ QueryY(g, v′, f ′)] (56)
=
Prf ′,v′ [g
(f ′)(v′) = w ∧B′ ⊆ QueryY(g, v′, f ′)]
Prf ′,v′ [B′ ⊆ QueryY(g, v′, f ′)]
(57)
=
Prv′,y1,...,yr [g
′(v′, y1, . . . , yr) = w ∧B
′ ⊆ {y1, . . . , yr}]
Pry1,...,yr [B
′ ⊆ {y1, . . . , yr}]
(58)
≥
2(r−|B
′|)n+ 2n
30 2−m−rn(
r
|B′|
)
(|B′|!)2−(|B′|)(n−1)
(59)
≥
2−m−|B
′|n+ 2n
30
2r log(r)2−|B′|(n−1)
= 2−m+
2n
30
−r log(r)−r ≥ 2−m+
n
30 , (60)
where in (58) and afterwards, y1, . . . , yr are picked uniformly from {0, 1}
n, but without repetition.
The numerator in (59) can then be seen as follows: first, note that the probability only decreases
if one picks the yi with repetition, but additionally requires them to be different for the event to
occur. After that, one notices that there must be at least 2(r−|B
′|)n+ 2n
30 tuples (v, y1, . . . , yr) for which
EB,w,y∗ gets increased in the algorithm UpperBound. The denominator follows by noting that we
can first choose how to make the assignment of the values in B′ to the elements (y1, . . . , yr) (there
are
( r
|B′|
)
(|B′|!) possibilities for this), and then checking whether this assignment occurs, which
happens with probability at most 2−|B
′|(n−1). Thus, we get that ¬SafeToAnswer(w, {y1, . . . , yr})
must hold for any tuple where EB,w,y∗ is increased, which is the required contradiction.
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6.4 Kim-Vu style concentration
In a fundamental paper [KV00], Kim and Vu consider low degree polynomials P in variables
x1, . . . , xℓ, and show that if ∂BP can be bounded (as in Lemma 20), then P will be concentrated
around its expectation, assuming the variables xi are picked independently at random.
Because in our case the variables are not picked independently, we need to use a different bound
(other than that, the original Kim-Vu bound would be strong enough for our purpose). The bound
we use requires the following concept of almost independence.
Definition 21. A distribution Px over {0, 1}
ℓ is (δ,m)-almost independent if for all sets M of size
|M | < m and any j /∈M
Pr
x←Px
[xj = 1|∀i ∈M : xi = 1] ≤ Pr
x←Px
[xj = 1](1 + δ) (61)
We use the following bound, which is proven in [Hol11]. It uses a technique first used implicitly
by [SSS95] and which was later used in [Rao08] to prove concentration bounds for parallel repetition,
and by [IK10] to prove constructive concentration results.
For a polynomial P in variables xj , and a distribution Px over these variables, we let P
∗
x be
the distribution obtained by picking each xj independently of the others, but with the marginal
distribution given by Px. We then set µ
∗ = E
x←P∗x
[P (x)] and E∗ = max
∅(B⊆{x1,...,xℓ}
E
x←P∗x
[∂BP (x)].
Theorem 22. Let Px be an (δ, rm)-almost independent distribution over {0, 1}
ℓ. Let P (x) be a
polynomial of degree at most r in the variables xi, i.e., P (x) =
∑n
j=1 vj with vj =
∏
i∈ej
vj, where
|ej | ≤ r.
Then,
Pr
x←Px
[
P (x) ≥ µ∗(1 + ǫ)
]
≤
((1 + δ)r(1 + rrmrE∗µ∗ )
1 + ǫ
)m
. (62)
Using this bound, we can now prove Lemma 14.
Proof (of Lemma 14). We use Theorem 22 on the polynomial Pw,y∗, where we set δ = 1, ǫ = 2
9n
100 /µ∗
and m = 2
n
100r . We note first that indeed the random variables F(i,j) are (δ, rm)-independent:
conditioning on F(x,y) = 1 is the same as conditioning on f(x) = y, and so we can see that one
needs to condition on at least 2n−1 such events in order to double the probability that F(x,y) = 1
for any (x, y).
Thus, Theorem 22 yields:
Pr
f←P
[Pw,y∗(f) ≥ µ
∗ + 2
9n
100 ] ≤
(2rmax(2, 2rr2 n100E∗µ∗ )
2
9n
100
µ∗
)2n/100r
(63)
≤ max
(2 · 2rµ∗
2
9n
100
,
2 · 2rrr2
n
100E∗
2
9n
100
)2n/100r
(64)
≤ (12)
2n/100r , (65)
where we applied Lemma 20 to bound both µ∗ and E∗ in the last step. An application of Lemma 19
finishes the proof.
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7 Non-uniform reductions and superpolynomial security
Theorem 5 excludes the existence of a uniform black-box reduction constructing a pseudorandom
generator from a one-way function with few calls. Potentially, one way to overcome this lower bound
would be to give a non-uniform security reduction, in which case the result would be weaker, but
still very interesting. Such non-uniform construction can be excluded by the techniques given in
[GGKT05], and we apply their technique here to prove that our lower bound applies to non-uniform
constructions as well.
Furthermore, we also generalize our results to one-way functions with different security.
Definition 23. A non-uniform fully black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator from
a regular one-way function with security s(k) consists of two oracle algorithms (g,A). The con-
struction g(f) is a polynomial time oracle algorithm which provides, for each k, a function gk :
{0, 1}m(k) → {0, 1}m
′(k) with m′(k) > m(k). For this, gk may call fk as an oracle, and m(k),m
′(k)
may depend on n(k) and n′(k).
Further, the security reduction A(·,·)(k, ·, ·) is an oracle algorithm which does at most s(k)
queries, and has the property that for any regular function f and any oracle B for which
Pr
v,B
[B(k, gk(v)) = 1]− Pr
w,B
[B(k,w) = 1] ≥
1
100
(66)
for infinitely many k, there is hk ∈ {0, 1}
s(k) such that
Pr
x,A
[A(B,f)(k, hk, fk(x)) inverts fk] >
1
s(k)
(67)
for infinitely many k.
Similar to before, A(k, ·, ·) only calls the oracles f(k, ·) and B(k, ·).
In an actual reduction, one would of course excpect that it works given a much weaker condition
than (66). In particular, a reasonable reduction will invert f with some probability if the constant
1
100 is replaced by any polynomial. Excluding constructions which even adhere to Definition 23 is
of course then stronger.
7.1 BreakOW does not non-uniformly invert
We first show that no non-uniform oracle algorithm with access to BreakOW inverts a random
permutation f .
Lemma 24. Let g(·) : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}m∗ be an r-query normalized oracle construction, n100r ∈ N.
Fix an oracle function C(BreakOW,f)(y) making at most q < 2
n
10 queries to its oracles. Let W be the
set which contains all permutations f ∈ P for which both
Pr
y←{0,1}n
[C(BreakOW,f)(y) = f−1(y)] ≥ 2−
n
20 , and (68)
∀w, y∗ : |Qf,w,y∗| ≤ 2
n
10 (69)
holds. Then, |W||P| ≤ 2
−2n/2 .
Proof. As in [GGKT05], we find an encoding of f which is 2
n
2 bits shorter than log(2n!) (the
minimal length of a bitstring needed to describe an arbitrary permutation on 2n elements). The
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encoding has the property that f can be recovered (given C) from it. Actually, it is somewhat
easier to describe the encoding simply as a injective function F mapping onto a set with fewer than
(2n!)2−2
n/2
elements, which is of course equivalent.
Fix some function f which satisfies both (68) and (69). We first find a large subset S of the
images of f , which has the property that F does not need to describe how f maps elements of
f−1(S) to S, and yet F will be injective. For this, we first modify C such that whenever it queries
v = BreakOW(f)(w), it afterwards evaluates g(f)(v) on the result (unless BreakOW returned ⊥).
Then, the following algorithm outputs S.
Algorithm BuildSets(f)
Modify C as in the text
I := {y : C(BreakOW,f)(y) = f−1(y)}
while I 6= ∅ do
y∗ ← I /An arbitrary element of I
S := S ∪ {y∗}
Let Q be the answers of f to the queries done by C(BreakOW,f)(y∗).
for x∗ ∈ {0, 1}n do
f∗ := f(x∗,y∗)
if there is w such that C(BreakOW,f)(y∗) calls BreakOW(f)(w) and
BreakOW(f)(w) 6= BreakOW(f
∗)(w) then
Q := Q ∪QueryY(g,BreakOW(f
∗)(w), f)
I := I \ (Q ∪ {y∗})
return S
We show that |S| ≥ s := 2
19n/20
2n/102n/5+r2n/10+1
≥ 2
3n
5 . First, from (68) we see that |I| ≥ 2
19n
20 . We
claim that for each y, Q has size at most |Q| ≤ 2
n
10 2
n
5 + r2
n
10 when it is removed from I. We get
this since C makes at most 2
n
10 calls to BreakOW(w), and Lemma 15 implies that for each of these
calls, there can be at most 2
n
5 elements x∗ for which BreakOW(f
∗)(w) 6= BreakOW(f)(w). Further,
g makes at most r2
n
10 calls to f (due to our modification above this is a bit larger than 2
n
10 ).
Let now S′ ⊆ S be some subset of size s, set t = 2n − s, and let x0, . . . , xt−1 be the elements
of {0, 1}n which are not preimages of elements in S′, in lexicographic order. We show in the
next paragraph that the map F which maps f 7→ (x0, f(x0), . . . , xt−1, f(xt−1)) is injective. The
number of possible images can be counted by first considering the possible sets {x0, . . . , xt−1} and
{f(x0), . . . , f(xt−1)} (there are
(2n
t
)
=
(2n
s
)
of those) and then considering the t! permutations from
the first to the second set, which shows that
|W|
|P|
≤
(
2n
s
)2 (2n − s)!
2n!
=
(
2n
s
)
1
s!
≤
(e22n
s2
)s
≤ 2−s . (70)
It remains to show that the map is injective. To see this, suppose that f1 6= f2 satisfy F(f1) =
F(f2). Then, f
−1
1 (y) = f
−1
2 (y) for all y for which f
−1
1 (y) 6= C
(BreakOW,f1)(y) (the pair (f−11 (y), y)
appears in F(f1), and so it must also appear in F(f2)). Since this holds analogous for f2, there
must be (x1, x2, y) such that x1 = C
(BreakOW,f1)(y) = f−11 (y) 6= f
−1
2 (y) = C
(BreakOW,f2)(y) = x2.
Since the two answers of C(y) differ in the two runs, there must be some call of C to an oracle
with the same input, but for which the two answers differ. This cannot be a call to the oracle f1 or
f2, as otherwise this call would appear in F(f1) and in F(f2). Thus, it must be that some for some
w we have v1 := BreakOW
(f1)(w) 6= BreakOW(f2)(w) =: v2, and BreakOW(w) is actually called by
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C in both experiments. Suppose without loss of generality that v1 occurs first in the enumeration
within BreakOW. Then, one of the queries which g(f1)(v1) does must have answer y, as otherwise
all elements of Query(g, v1, f1) would appear in F(f1), and so BreakOW(w)
(f2)(w) = v1 as well.
Thus, one of the answers was y, and since the other answers appear in F(f1), f2 and f1 behave
the same for these answers. But this implies that BreakOW(f
∗
2 )(w) 6= BreakOW(f2)(w), where
f∗2 = (f2)x1,y, and so (x1, f2(x1)) must appear in F(f2), which contradicts F(f1) = F(f2).
7.2 Non-uniform black-box separation
We can now prove Theorem 6, which we restate for convenience.
Theorem 6. Let r(k), s(k), n(k) be given, and assume r(k) < n(k)1000 log(s(k)) for infinitely many
k. Then, there is no non-uniform security parameter restricted fully black-box construction of
a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function with security s which has the property that
g(k, v) does at most r(k) calls to f(k, ·).
Proof. As previously, we use Theorem 9 and thus assume we have a non-uniform fully black-box
reduction which yields a pseudouniform one-way function.
Thus, we suppose we are given (g,A). Again we set n(k) := n′(k) := k, and let m(k) be the
input length of g as provided by the reduction. Let r(k) the number of calls to f . As before we
assume that n(k)100r(k) ∈ N, and modify g so it is normalized.
For all k with r(k) ≥ n(k)1000 log(s(k)) we let Breakerk be the function which always outputs 0 and
fk a permutation which is one-way against circuits of size 2
n
5 , which exists by [GGKT05].
Otherwise, we consider p(gk). If p(gk) ≥
1
2 we set Breakerk to be BreakOW. Lemma 12 again
implies that BreakOW helps to invert g, but now we apply Lemma 24 and the union bound to get
a function which is hard to invert for all hk.
If p(gk) ≤
1
2 , Lemma 17 gives a set Wk ⊆ {0, 1}
m(k) and Yk ⊆ {0, 1}
n(k) for which the output
of g(f) is likely distinguished from uniform by BreakPU.
Writing the function f as f = π ◦ p for some a random permutation π on Y and a regular
function p : {0, 1}n → Y we can apply Theorem 1 of [GGKT05] (which also holds if the circuit has
oracle gates to BreakPU). We can thus find a function which is hard for A and any advice string
hk, and yet the output g
(f) will be distinguished from uniform.
8 Non-security parameter restricted constructions
8.1 Fixing the polynomial in the construction
Suppose that we have given a black-box construction (g,A) of a pseudouniform one-way function
from a one-way function together with its security reduction. The requirement on the efficiency of
the construction is that for every choice of (f,Breaker), both g and A should run in polynomial
time. In other words, for any (f,Breaker) there should be c ∈ N such that f(k, ·) and Breaker(k, ·)
run in time kc. Note that c can depend on f and Breaker.
There do exist constructions (g,A) which are polynomial for any (f,Breaker), but where c
indeed depends inherently on the oracle.11 However, it turns out that it is always possible to fix
11An example follows: suppose the function g(k, v) first queries f(0, 0), f(1, 0), . . . , f(log(ℓ),0). If all answers were
the 0-string, execute some algorithm which runs in linear time. Otherwise, let c′ be the index of the first answer
which differs, and execute an algorithm which runs in time kc
′+1.
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finitely many outputs of the oracles f and Breaker such that after fixing these, c is independent of
the choice of the remaining positions.
A prefix (f∗,Breaker∗) is simply the truth table for these oracles for lengths up to some integer
k0; oracles (f,Breaker) agree with the prefix if their truth table up to length k0 equals the one
given by the prefix. A prefix (f (2),Breaker(2)) extends a prefix (f (1),Breaker(1)) if the truth table
of (f (2),Breaker(2)) is larger than the truth table of (f (1),Breaker(1)), and they agree everywhere
where (f (1),Breaker(1)) is defined.
Lemma 25. Suppose a black-box reduction (g(f), A(Breaker,f)) is given, and fix some length function
n(k). There exists a prefix (f∗,Breaker∗) and c ∈ N such that for any pair (f,Breaker) which agrees
with (f∗,Breaker∗) we have the following properties:
1. g(f)(ℓ, ·) makes at most ℓc queries to f(k, ·), and all of these queries satisfy k ≤ ℓc
2. A(Breaker,f)(k,w) makes at most kc queries to Breaker(ℓ, ·), and all of these queries satisfy
ℓ ≤ kc
3. A(Breaker,f)(k,w) makes at most kc queries to f(k′, ·), and all of these queries satisfy k′ ≤ kc.
Proof. Suppose not, let d ∈ N, and suppose we have given any prefix (f (d),Breaker(d)). Then,
there exists a pair (f,Breaker) of oracles which agree with (f (d),Breaker(d)) and where one of 1,
2, or 3 is violated for c = (d + 1). Fix a length k for which this is violated, and find a prefix
(f (d+1),Breaker(d+1)) of (f,Breaker) such that all queries done for up to security parameter k are
fixed in the prefix.
Thus, there is an infinite sequence of prefixes {(f (i),Breaker(i))}i≥0 such that (f
(i+1),Breaker(i+1))
extends (f (i),Breaker(i)), and for any d ∈ N there is an input which violates one of the conclusions
of the lemma.
Clearly, such an infinite sequence defines a pair (f,Breaker) for which (g,A) is not polynomial.
8.2 Excluding general reductions
We now come to the proof of Theorem 7, which we restate for convenience.
Theorem 7. Fix a length function n(k). Let (g,A) be a fully black-box construction of a pseudo-
random generator from a regular one-way function. Then, there is an oracle f for which
rf ∈ Ω
( n−f
log(n−f )
)
. (7)
Preparations for the proof As before, we prove the analogous statement for pseudouniform
one-way functions. Also, we assume that the theorem is not true, and that we have given (g,A),
and show that we can find oracles (f,Breaker) which contradict the assumption that (g,A) is a
fully black-box construction.
We can assume that g(ℓ, v) never queries f(k, x) twice for any (k, x). Also, we use Lemma 25,
which fixes a prefix for (f,Breaker) and gives us a constant c for which the properties in Lemma 25
are satisfied, we will use this constant throughout the proof.
We now choose k0 and set ℓ0 = k
c
0 such that neither f(k0, ·) nor Breaker(ℓ0, ·) has been defined
by Lemma 25. Furthermore, define all oracles Breaker(ℓ, ·) for ℓ < ℓ0 which have not been defined
yet to oracles which do nothing (i.e., constantly output ⊥). Analogously, define all oracles f(k, ·)
for k < k0 which have not been defined yet to random permutations of length n(k).
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Next, we pick a constant c˜ for later. We require that it satisfies that for any k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc}
we have ℓ1/c˜ ≤ n(k) ≤ ℓc˜; this is possible because n(k) is a length function.
Overview and some basics of the proof In the main part of the proof, we define the oracles
Breaker(ℓ, ·) and f(k, ·). We essentially use one iteration for each ℓ, and increase ℓ over time. At
the beginning of iteration ℓ, we will have defined the oracles Breaker(1, ·), . . . ,Breaker(ℓ− 1, ·) and
f(k, ·) for any k < ℓ1/c.
At this point, we enumerate each n which is possibly the length of the shortest query made by
g(ℓ, ·), ignoring the length of those for which f(k, ·) has been defined already.
For each such n, we consider the probability
qℓ,n := Pr
v,f
[
g(f)(ℓ, v) queries f on security parameters k ≥ ℓ1/c a total of at most
n
d log(n) times, and for all these queries f(k, ·) we have n(k) ≥ n
]
where f(k, ·) is chosen as random permutation for any k ≥ ℓ1/c. The parameter d will be defined
later, and is slowly growing as ℓ→∞.
We then distinguish two cases: The first case is if qℓ,n ≤ ℓ
−c˜−2 for all n.
In this case, we define Breaker(ℓ, ·) := ⊥, so that it does nothing on this length, increase ℓ, and
go to the next iteration. We will show that infinitely often qℓ,n must be larger than ℓ
−c˜−2 for some
n, as otherwise we can obtain an oracle (f,Breaker) for which rf ∈ Ω(n
−
f / log(n
−
f )).
The second case is more interesting: there is n˜ for which qℓ,n˜ > ℓ
−c˜−2.
In this case, we know that with some polynomial probability, g(ℓ, ·) will only make few queries.
We would like to apply the previous machinery, but cannot do so directly: g possibly makes more
than n˜/d log(n˜) many queries for some oracle f , and possibly queries f on input lengths shorter
than n˜ for some oracle f .
Also (and this is the problem we fix first), the previous machinery only allows g to make queries
to one fixed input length n˜, whereas g may query f with many different parameters k for which
n(k) ≥ n˜.
To solve this, we use the following idea: underlying to f(k, ·) could in fact be a single one-way
function f˜ : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n˜ for many different values of k, so that f(k, x) = Sk(f˜(Pk(x))) for some
simple to compute projection Pk : {0, 1}
n(k) → {0, 1}n˜ and some expansion Sk : {0, 1}
n˜ → {0, 1}n(k).
Thus, we pick uniform random injective functions Pk and uniform injective expansions Sk for
each k for which n(k) ≥ n˜. We then consider the construction g˜
(f˜ ,f,P,S)
n . This construction is is
defined as follows:
The function g˜
(f˜ ,f,P,S)
n simulates g, except whenever g calls the oracle f .
In case g calls f(k, x) for some k with k < ℓ1/c, the answer of f(k, x) is hard-coded into
g˜ (because f is already defined on these lengths).
If g calls f(k, x) for some k with n(k) < n˜ and k ≥ ℓ1/c, then g˜ calls f(k, x) as well.
In case g calls f(k, x) for some k with n(k) ≥ n˜, and k ≥ ℓ1/c, g˜n instead calls
Sk(f˜(Pk(x))).
The function g˜ behaves almost as g when f˜ is chosen as a random permutation. The only exception
is in the unlikely case that Pk(x) = Pk(x
′) for two queries (k, x) 6= (k, x′) to f .
The function g˜ solves the last problem above, so that we get closer to apply the previous
machinery. However, g˜ still can make more than n˜/d log(n˜) queries to f or query f on shorter
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inputs than n˜ for some f . Thus, we consider the construction h˜, which is just like g˜, but has
additional restrictions:
Whenever g˜ does more than n˜/d log(n˜) calls, h˜ simply stops and outputs (v,⊥).
Whenever g does a call to f(k, ·) with n(k) < n˜ and k ≥ k0, h˜ stops and outputs (v,⊥).
We note that h˜ does not need to call the oracle f at any time anymore.
As long as d→∞ for ℓ→∞, the results from the previous sections will guarantee that breaking
the pseudouniformity of h˜ does not help inverting f˜ . The main difficulty is that h˜ may behave very
differently from g˜. However, we can note that
Pr
f˜ ,P,S,v,f
[h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) = g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v)] ≥ qℓ,n˜ −
n˜2
2n˜
(71)
because as long as no two queries to Pk(·) collide in the evaluation of g˜, each query will be answered
with a uniform random answer, and so g and g˜ will behave exactly the same.
We are now interested in the probability that BreakOW inverts a random image of g˜. To
apply the previous machinery, we want to instantiate BreakOW using h˜. Thus, we consider the
probability
pℓ,n˜ := Pr
f˜ ,P,S,v,f
[SafeToAnswerh˜(h˜
f˜ ,P,S(v),QueryY(h˜, f˜ , v)) ∧ (72)
h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) = g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v)] .
Here, SafeToAnswer is instantiated using h˜ instead of g.12
We will then show that we can do a similar case distinction pℓ,n˜ as we did in the previous
sections on p(g). This will allow us to build oracles (f(k, ·),Breaker(ℓ, ·)) where Breaker(ℓ, ·) breaks
the construction on this length.
After this, we set Breaker(ℓ′, ·) := ⊥ for ℓ < ℓ′ < ℓc
2
, which ensures that there is no problem
because different lengths are interfering with each other. We then go to the next iteration for which
Breaker(ℓ, ·) is not yet defined.
Building the oracles We now describe a randomized procedure which builds oracles f and
Breaker by building a sequence of extending prefixes (as in the proof of Lemma 25). After this, we
prove that the oracle arising from this sequence has the required properties with probability 1.
Algorithm GenerateOracles
Fix Breaker and f up to some length using Lemma 25, then ensure that
f(k, ·) is defined up to security parameter k0 for some k0, and that
Breaker(ℓ, ·) is defined up to kc0.
d := 1
ℓ := smallest ℓ for which Breaker(ℓ, ·) has not yet been defined
do forever
/ We define Breaker(ℓ, ·) in this iteration
if ∀n ∈ {ℓ1/c˜, . . . , ℓc˜}: qℓ,n ≤ ℓ
−(c˜+2) then
12Strictly speaking, to instantiate SafeToAnswer we should give it a function h˜ which only uses the oracle f˜ , but
not oracles P and S. For that purpose, one can think of P and S as being hardcoded into h˜.
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Breaker(ℓ, ·) := ⊥ /Breaker will not help on this length
if ∃k ∈ N : kc = ℓ then
f(k, ·)← Πn(k) /A random permutation on n(k) bits
else
let n˜ be such that qℓ,n˜ > ℓ
−(c˜+2)
if pℓ,n˜ ≤
1
2ℓ
−(c˜+2) then
try at most ℓc˜+3 times
BuildPUBreaker(ℓ, n˜)
stop if Breaker(ℓ, ·) has distinguishing advantage at least ℓ−(c˜+3),
otherwise roll back the changes and try the loop again
else
try at most ℓc˜+3 times
BuildOWBreaker(ℓ, n˜)
stop if Breaker(ℓ, ·) inverts g with probability at least ℓ−(c˜+3),
otherwise roll back the changes and try the loop again
fi
d := d+ 1
ℓ := ℓ+ 1
procedure BuildPUBreaker(ℓ, n˜)
r := n˜/d log(n˜)
Pick Y ⊆ {0, 1}n˜, |Y| = 2n˜/100r u.a.r.
for each k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc} with n(k) ≥ n˜ do
pick a regular function Pk : {0, 1}
n(k) → {0, 1}n˜ u.a.r.
pick an injective function Sk : {0, 1}
n˜ → {0, 1}n(k) u.a.r.
/ At this point, h˜ and Y are defined
Obtain W (using h˜ as underlying function) as in Lemma 17.
Breaker(ℓ, ·) := BreakPU(W )
Pick a regular function f˜ : {0, 1}n˜ → Y u.a.r.
for each k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc} do
if n(k) ≥ n˜ then
f(k, ·) := Sk ◦ f˜ ◦ Pk
else
f(k, ·)← Πn(k)
for ℓ′ ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , ℓc
2
} do
Breaker(ℓ′, ·) := ⊥
ℓ := ℓc
2
+ 1
procedure BuildOWBreaker(ℓ, n˜)
r := n˜/d log(n˜)
for each k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc} with n(k) ≥ n˜ do
pick a regular function Pk : {0, 1}
n(k) → {0, 1}n˜ u.a.r.
pick an injective function Sk : {0, 1}
n˜ → {0, 1}n(k) u.a.r.
/ At this point, h˜ is defined
Breaker(ℓ, ·) := BreakOW
(f˜)
h˜
(·)
Pick a permutation f˜ : {0, 1}n˜ → {0, 1}n˜ u.a.r.
for each k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc} do
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if n(k) ≥ n˜ then
f(k, ·) := Sk ◦ f˜ ◦ Pk
else
f(k, ·)← Πn(k)
for ℓ′ ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , ℓc
2
} do
Breaker(ℓ′, ·) := ⊥
ℓ := ℓc
2+1
Clearly, GenerateOracles defines an infinite sequence of prefixes (f (i),Breaker(i)), and as before
we can extend that to a single oracle (f,Breaker). Analogously, we can extend events which are
defined on prefixes to an infinite sequence of events.
We next explain how these procedures make their random choices. For this we assume that for
each k ∈ N, a permutation f(k, ·) is picked. Whenever GenerateOracles executes the assignment
f(k, ·) ← Πn(k) (in the part where it defines Breaker(ℓ, ·) := ⊥, it assigns f(k, x) := f(k, x)). We
can imagine these permutations to be picked before GenerateOracles is executed (in that way, we
can talk about future assignments).
Also, for each ℓ and each k ∈ {ℓ1/c, . . . , ℓc}, we pick ℓc+3 choices for Sk, Pk. Also, for each
possible n˜ we pick ℓc+3 choices for f˜ . Then, in the ith iteration, we simply assume that the ith
such choice is used. As with f , this is useful in order to argue about future assignments.
Lemma 26. Consider an execution of the algorithm GenerateOracles. For each ℓ, let Nℓ be the
event that the else clause of algorithm GenerateOracles is executed on iteration ℓ.
Then, with probability 1, infinitely many events Nℓ occur.
Proof. We let dℓ be the random variable which takes the value of d in the ℓth iteration of Genera-
teOracles.
For each ℓ and each n ∈ {1, . . . , ℓc} we now define an event Bℓ,n. For this event, we stop
the normal execution of GenerateOracles at loop ℓ, and instead extend f using f exclusively (i.e.,
fill everything with the random permutations we picked before). We then let Bℓ,n be the event
which occurs if rf ≤ n/(dℓ log(n)) and n
−
f = n in this extension. Clearly Pr[Bℓ,n ∧ ¬Nℓ] ≤
Pr[Bℓ,n|¬Nℓ] ≤ ℓ
−(c˜+2), because in case we extend with random permutations, qℓ,n is defined
exactly as the probability that the event Bℓ,n occurs.
Thus,
∑
ℓ,n≤ℓc˜ Pr[Bℓ,n ∧ ¬Nℓ] <∞, and so by the Borel-Cantelli lemma, (Bℓ,n ∧ ¬Nℓ) happens
for infinitely many ℓ with probability 0.
Now, suppose that in some execution only finitely many events Bℓ,n happen. Then we found
an oracle for which rf ∈ Ω(n
−
f / log(n
−
f )), because in this case we do extended only using f starting
from some fixed length.
Therefore, in all executions infinitely many events Bℓ,n happen, and so the event Nℓ must
happen for infinitely many ℓ with probability 1.
Lemma 27. Suppose that qℓ,n˜ > ℓ
−(c˜+2), pℓ,n˜ ≤
1
2ℓ
−(c˜+2), d > 2c, and ℓ is larger than some
constant in an execution of the loop in algorithm GenerateOracles.
Then, with probability at least 18ℓ
−(c˜+2), after a single call to BuildPUBreaker(ℓ, n˜), the oracle
BreakPU(ℓ, ·) has advantage at least 18ℓ
−(c˜+2) in distinguishing g(ℓ, v) from a uniform random
string.
Proof. We first notice that Prw←{0,1}m(ℓ) [BreakPU(ℓ, w) = 1] is negligible: Lemma 17 gives a set
W of size at most 2m(ℓ)−
n˜
100 and n˜ ≥ ℓ−c˜.
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We next show that
Pr
v,f˜ ′,f,P,S
[g˜f˜
′,f,P,S(v) ∈W ] ≥
1
3
ℓ(c˜+2) , (73)
where f˜ ′ is chosen as a random function f˜ ′ : {0, 1}n˜ → Y, for Y of size 2n˜/100r chosen uniformly at
random. From (73) we get the lemma by applying Markov’s inequality.
To see (73), we use that
Pr
v,f˜ ′,f,P,S
[g˜f˜
′,f,P,S(v) ∈W ] ≥ Pr
v,f˜ ,f,P,S
[g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v) ∈W ]−
r2
|Y|
,
where f˜ ∈ Pn˜ is a uniform random permutation on n˜ bits: this follows as in the proof of Lemma 17.
We now see that
Pr
v,f˜ ,f,P,S
[g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v) ∈W ]
≥ Pr
v,f˜ ,f,P,S
[h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) ∈W ∧ h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) = g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v)]
≥ Pr
v,f˜ ,f,P,S
[(
¬SafeToAnswerh˜(h˜
f˜ ,P,S(v),QueryY(h˜, f˜ , v))
)
∧ h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) = g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v)
]
,
due to the definition of W in the proof of Lemma 17.
Using (71), we see that this last probability is at least qℓ,n˜ − pℓ,n˜ −
n˜2
2n˜
, which gives (73), and
therefore the lemma.
Lemma 28. Suppose that pℓ,n˜ ≥
1
2ℓ
−(c˜+2). Then, with probability at least 14ℓ
−(c˜+2), after a call to
BuildOWBreaker(ℓ, n˜), the oracle BreakOW will invert g(ℓ, v) with probability at least 14ℓ
−(c˜+2).
Proof. Consider, for fixed (f˜ , f, P, S) the probability that
p′ := Pr
v
[SafeToAnswerh˜(h˜
f˜ ,P,S(v),QueryY(h˜, f˜ , v)) ∧ h˜f˜ ,P,S(v) = g˜f˜ ,f,P,S(v)] . (74)
We know that pℓ,n˜ = Ef˜ ,P,S,f [p
′] ≥ 12ℓ
−(c˜+2). Thus, with probability 14ℓ
−(c˜+2), p′ is at least 14ℓ
−(c˜+2).
Now, after BreakOW fixed f˜ , f, P, S, in case p′ ≥ 14ℓc+2 , it is clear that BreakOW will invert g with
this probability (because for any w which is chosen as w = g(v), h˜ has no preimages of w which g
does not have, and BreakOW will at least find the preimage v for h˜).
Lemma 29. With probability 1, the probability that A(k, ·) inverts f(k, ·) is a negligible function
in k.
Proof. Let Bk,α be the event that A(k, ·) inverts f(k, ·) with probability at least k
−α. We show
that for any α ∈ N, with probability 1, finitely many events Bk,α happen. By the Borel-Cantelli
lemma it is enough to show that
∑
k Pr[Bk,α] <∞ for any α. For this, it is clearly enough to show
that Pr[Bk,α] is a negligible function in k for any α.
To show this, we distinguish cases. First, consider the case that f(k, ·) is picked as a random
permutation in GenerateOracles, i.e., the case where where qℓ,n ≤ ℓ
−(c˜+2) for all n and kc = ℓ.
All oracles Breaker(ℓ, ·) which A(k, ·) can possibly access are fixed before f(k, ·) is chosen, and
so we can ignore them. The same holds for all oracles f(k′, ·) for k′ ≤ k.
However, A can also access f(k′, ·) for k < k′ ≤ kc. These are picked later, and the distribution
can depend on f(k, ·).
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Luckily, there is only a polynomial number of possibilities how the functions f(k′, ·) for k <
k′ ≤ kc will be chosen in the end. To see that, note that we can specify how all of these f(k′, ·) are
chosen by specifying
• the integer ℓ ∈ {kc, . . . , kc
2
} for which the algorithm GenerateOracles uses the else clause, in
case there is one (note that there is at most one)
• the integer n˜ which GenerateOracles uses in this case
• whether GenerateOracles uses BuildPUBreaker or BuildOWBreaker,
• and which of the at most ℓc˜+3 iterations is used in the end.
Once we have specified these numbers, we see that we know which of the choices for Sk, Pk, f˜ , and
so on are used to pick f(k′, ·) for all these k′.
We can now simply check whether A(k, ·) inverts f(k, ·) with probability k−α for any of these
random choices. Since this probability is negligible, we apply the union bound and get the result
in this case.
The same argument works in case f(k, ·) is picked from Πn(k) in either BuildOWBreaker or
BuildPUBreaker (because n(k) < n˜).
Thus, consider the last case where f(k, ·) is set to Sk ◦ f˜ ◦ Pk in either BuildOWBreaker or
BuildPUBreaker. Then, for any intertion we consider the breaker which tries to invert f˜ by first
inverting Sk, then running A(k, ·), and then applying Pk on the result. The probability that this
algorithm inverts f˜ in any of the at most ℓc iterations of BuildPUBreaker or BuildOWBreaker is
negligible (by the previous sections), and so we get the result in this case as well.
Finishing the proof We can now finish the proof of Theorem 7.
First, we see that with probability 1 the oracles (f,Breaker) generated are such that Breaker
either infinitely often breaks the one-wayness or the pseudouniformity of g: first, due to Lemma 26
we see that we will infinitely often attempt to construct Breaker in one of the two ways, and by
either Lemma 27 or Lemma 28 we see that the probability that this only works finitely many times
is 0 (again using Borel-Cantelli). By Lemma 29 we see that f will be one-way for A, which proves
the result.
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